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Date Sent NOVEMBER 24, 1958
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FROM American Embassy, BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO G/349

REF ID: Bonn's G-252, September 29, 1958.

RPTD: American Embassy LONDON UNN PARIS UNN PARIS FOR USRO UNN

Amenages: BREMEN, DUSSELDORF, FRANKFURT, HAMBURG, MUNICH, STUTTGART, USLER.

Following is summary of events and atmosphere in FedRep in recent weeks. Most important is threatened Soviet move to strengthen status of CDU which dominates scene today and will have profound effect on further developments. Since summary of September 29 (refd airgram) Chancellor has been beaten by dissidence on foreign policy in his own party, by election campaigns in Hesse and Bavaria, by revelation of conversations between his Minister of Justice and Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin, by problems, particularly on FTA, in relations with Britain and France, and now ~~now~~ this new and dangerous Soviet gambit.

by

This has been period of strain between Chancellor and CDU leaders seeking new look in foreign policy. Gerstenmaier, Kissinger, Lemke, Grahl and their friends, worked with Opposition, each in his own way and for his own reasons, to produce Bundestag resolutions of July 2 and October 1. This led to position in Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee which forced Federal Government, in reply to Soviet note of September 18, to keep door open to peace treaty negotiations as step toward solution German problem. This was expressed in principle of "no negative limitations" on tasks of Four Power Commission in German reply to Soviets November 17. Formulation was accepted by all but like phraseology of ~~new~~ joint Bundestag resolutions, it covers over real differences of approach to reunification. Chancellor is probably no more willing now than before to abandon principle of free elections but, unable or unwilling to override Bundestag directly, has left it for Western powers to defend established positions if Four Power Commission formed. In such negotiations we have no reason to believe Chancellor would take different or weaker position than heretofore and he continues have the decisive voice and, on this issue, can command solid support of party with exception small number intellectually active, personally ambitious and prominent CDU personalities. Mass of public shows no signs enhanced interest either in reunification or in experiments with Soviets. None of CDU dissidents really believe Sovs are ready to reunite Germany but these men take position; (1) it is unreasonable to expect Soviets to accept German reunification without prior East-West agreement on international status of United Germany; (2) intellectual levels of

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
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population in parties and especially in press realize point 1; and (3) it is, therefore, better politics for CDU to be on record as having position Soviets might conceivably accept rather than one which German intelligentsia believes Soviets cannot accept under any circumstances.

Interparty collaboration which produced Bundestag joint resolution of July 2 on reunification was strained at the Berlin session of the Bundestag by a proposal, born in the Heinemann element of the SPD, for an "Office for Internal German Questions" to be responsible for coordination of all contacts between the FedRep and the GDR. The Coordinator was to have ministerial rank but was not to be part of the Government and would have his office in Berlin. The CDU rejects the idea as constitutionally impossible and politically dangerous. It was opposed notably by Grasl, who, like the rest of his party, saw in it a step toward dealing with the GDR at a political level, the very thing from which he hopes to hold the SPD back by his policy of interparty collaboration. This question continues to be the principal subject of those interparty meetings, under Lemmer's auspices, which have been severely criticized in CDU faction by Chancellor.

Direct negotiations with Pankow continue to be shunned by all parties but there is a strong view that the USSR can never agree to reunification without GDR participation and, therefore, weight is given to German participation should the Four Power Commission meet. However, Chancellor's opposition to dealing with GDR was brought into public question by revelation of adventures of his Minister of Justice Fritz Schaeffer in Pankow in 1956. Real facts of the case are still obscure but all accounts agree that Schaeffer did arrange to call on Ambassador Pushkin through an East German official, that discussions probably with both East Germans and Soviets concerned the division of Germany and how to overcome it, and that the Chancellor knew about the meeting but did not (or could not) prevent it. The East Germans threaten to reveal more if Schaeffer does not do so.

The timing of these East German revelations may not be unrelated to new Soviet moves to build up the GDR. Khrushchev's attack on the Potsdam Agreement and the status of Berlin created unease which led even the Opposition to put new stress on close ties with the West. There is a certain tension in the air as the Soviets' next move is awaited. Ollenhauer, for one, has said privately that if to assure access to Berlin, the alternative to use of force is dealing with the GDR, surely some formula could be found, perhaps by treating the GDR officials as agents of the USSR. CDU leaders oppose any form of recognition GDR or backing down before Soviet ~~bluff~~ pressure.
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The principal internal effect of the Khrushchev speech has, however, been to dampen to a certain extent enthusiasm for new foreign policy approaches even, apparently, in the SED. It is unfortunate and perhaps not entirely coincidental that the current Soviet move comes at a time when the cool reception of President De Gaulle in London, General de Gaulle's proposal for NATO reorganisation, and the breakdown of EEA negotiations raised some doubts about the strength and stability of the Western alliance. German position on ~~the~~ EEA has been ambiguous with Chancellor and Foreign Minister anxious to avoid any strain in relations with France; and his economic experts tending stress both economic and political importance of pushing French to agree to larger areas. Chancellor's meeting with de Gaulle may be decisive on this issue.

Khrushchev's statement on Berlin, by proving the Chancellor "right again" about Soviet intentions, may also have strengthened the CDU/CSU's chances in Hessian elections and its already sure victory in Bavaria. Chancellor has thrown himself into the election campaign with obvious zest. In Bavaria he said that Adenauer speaks with the tone and vocabulary of the SPD and that what the SPD needs is greater devotion to Germany's interests. In Hesse he declared that those remarks seemed too moderate and repeated that SPD policies can only lead to disaster. The Chancellor's friends welcome this and are confident that in these elections, as in NW and Saarland-Rhineland, black and white differences and all out political war will rouse the apathetic voters and hold back any who might be inclined to drift away from the CDU. His less personally loyal colleagues say that public although still devoted to Adenauer, is tired of bitterness of such campaigns and inclined to discount his own accusations.

SPD is, of course, outraged at these insults and, in the frustration of repeated defeat, tends to talk of the return to a one-party state and of their exclusion from a proper role in the state. Much of this, however, is election talk and SPD leaders at both national and local levels are aware that their own future and that of party depend on avoiding irresponsible policies. They will continue to accuse the Government and its leaders of contempt for the German democracy and its institutions. Charges of corruption in high places are already making good newspaper copy and are due for Bundestag debate.

SPD irritation was increased when Minister of Interior Schroeder called publicly for an Emergency Powers law and for reorganization of Office for protection of Constitution into what he referred to, unfortunately, as a

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"Staatsicherheitsdienst" (State Security Service, a term with Nazi overtones). His terminology and tactics of public announcement without consultation added to the SPD's personal antagonism to Schroeder and they will oppose this legislation on grounds it is an effort to get police state powers into his hands.

Further developments depend largely on next Soviet moves. If current threats to Berlin prove as serious as they seem, they will overshadow all other aspects of German-Soviet relations and reinforce Adenauer's policies of Western alliance and firmness against Soviet threats. If an atmosphere exists in which negotiations seem possible, and if the Soviets react negatively to the Federal Republic's note of November 17, the "new approach" advocates may press again for negotiations on a peace treaty alone. They will meet solid resistance from the Chancellor and his loyal supporters but their steady pressure makes for unrest and a public impression of disunity. If a Four Power meeting were ever to come about, the real problems of a peace treaty, for instance border questions, might lead to some second thoughts among CDU dissidents. Conclusion of the election campaign, the approach of the holiday season, and a desire to appear united in all-German questions while these are active internationally, should calm internal squabbles. In the Bundestag social legislation will take much time and presentation of the budget and possibly debate on the Schaeffer case are the only major items now foreseen before the new year.

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